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In selected texts by Diderot, including the Encyclopédie article “Cabinet
d’histoire naturelle” (along with his comments in the article “Histoire nat-
urelle”), the Pensées sur l’interprétation de la nature and the Salon de
1767, I examine the interplay between philosophical naturalism and the rec-
ognition of the irreducible nature of artiªce, in order to arrive at a provi-
sional deªnition of Diderot’s vision of Nature as “une femme qui aime à se
travestir.” How can a metaphysics in which the concept of Nature has a nor-
mative status, also ultimately consider it to be something necessarily artiªc-
ial? Historically, the answer to this question involves the project of natural
history. A present-day reconstruction would have to make sense of this project
and relate it to the vision of Nature expressed in Diderot’s phrase. In addi-
tion, it would hopefully pinpoint the difference between this brand of En-
lightenment naturalism and contemporary naturalism, and by extension, al-
low us to understand a bit more about what naturalism is in general.
Naturalism—the reduction or explanation of all phenomena to what phi-
losophers used to call the “order of nature”—has enjoyed a rather vigorous
existence as a philosophical current for forty-odd years, but it has come
under some attack recently;1 the heroic era of Quinean “naturalized episte-
mology” or the various projects, cognitive, semantic and other, to ‘natural-
ize’ the mental have given way to an onslaught of ‘holisms’ and anti-
naturalisms, from Hilary Putnam to Robert Brandom. Similarly, on the
Continent there has long been an emphasis on the ‘primacy of artiªce’ and
a concomitant denial of any access to something called ‘Nature’ other than
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as a ªction, whether from the phenomenological camp (which asserts an
explicit anti-naturalism, if one recalls Husserl’s frequent comments that
“we are ªghting against naturalism”2) or from the post-Structuralist one,
doubtless indebted to Nietzsche’s virtuoso destruction of ‘Nature’ as a
philosophical concept, in section 109 of the Gay Science (a text which I
shall discuss in closing).3 And when the critics of naturalism try and pro-
vide a deªnition, they either say that the notion is vague and uninterest-
ing (which makes short shrift of the extremely novel kinds of naturalistic
programs found, e.g., in Spinoza and Dewey), or that it is limiting and
reductive. My suggestion in what follows is that these critics—that is,
anti-naturalists of various sorts—might be interested, or concerned, if
they took a look at the philosophy of nature articulated by the eighteenth-
century French materialist Denis Diderot, for they would ªnd there an ex-
tremely coherent reductio of all phenomena to natural phenomena, of all
causes to natural causes, along with a statement of the irreducible ‘arti-
ªciality’ or ‘ªctionality’ of our constructs of Nature . . .
Naturalism was clearly perceived as subversive in the Enlightenment,
and usually associated with other fearsome “isms” such as “Spinosisme,”
“atheism,” “pantheism” and of course “materialism.” But wouldn’t the
apologistes, the orthodox theologians crying out for the blood of the natu-
ralists from Holland to Spain and England have been relieved to learn that
the Nature of these “nouveaux philosophes,” the “esprits forts,” was in fact
a ªction (albeit a powerful and subversive ªction)? One such apologiste,
Laurent François, in his Proofs of the Religion of Christ against the Spinozists
and the Deists, complains about how “these purported philosophers are al-
ways to be heard speaking of ‘the Whole’, ‘the Great Whole’, ‘natural ne-
cessity’, ‘Nature’ and ‘the order of Nature’.”4
What nature is this? Which order of nature? Presumably something
like d’Holbach’s insistence on an unbroken chain of causes, ultimately
physical causes (since moral causes are only physical causes which we don’t
know the true nature of), such that even “our souls [or minds—CW] are
subject to the same physical laws as material bodies” (d’Holbach 1999,
I.xi, p. 287). This physicalist reductionism is, in fact, exactly what
Diderot will criticize, declaring “I am a man, I need causes which are
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2. Or “against the naturalization of consciousness” (Husserl 1981, pp. 302, 310).
Husserl’s target is sometimes the psychophysics of his time, sometimes eighteenth-century
naturalism, sometimes even Descartes, who is said rather surprisingly to have “physical-
ized” the mind.
3. This recognition is present in Deleuze’s suggestive statement that his ªnal project
with Guattari will be “une nouvelle philosophie de la nature, au moment où toute dif-
férence s’estompe entre la nature et l’artiªce” (Deleuze 1988, p. 25).
4. François (1751, I, p. 84). Unless otherwise indicated, all translations are my own.
proper to man,” thus disavowing his earlier position, and d’Holbach’s,
that “there is only one kind of causes, . . . physical causes.”5 This does not
prevent him, however, from maintaining a strong commitment to causal-
ity, the causal closure of the space-time world, and the determinism that
ensues: “in science, as in Nature itself, everything holds together” (“dans
la science, ainsi que dans la nature, tout tient”).6
Roughly, then, the anti-naturalist wishes to show that there are things
in the world—freedom, the soul, emotions, intentionality, qualia—which
are not reducible to (ontologically) or explainable in terms of (method-
ologically) what the science of our time tells us about the natural world.
Now, contemporary naturalism is more of a reconstructive program, precisely
one which runs up against the mind or intentionality, whereas Enlighten-
ment naturalism is an ontology—certainly in Meslier, La Mettrie, d’Hol-
bach and Diderot half the time, when he’s more of a Leibnizian ontologist
than a Lockean methodologist—which focuses more on what we might
call realism vs. instrumentalism, and asks, is our vision of nature a ªction?
My question is, what if naturalism were founded on such heuristic ‘con-
structs’ as a cabinet d’histoire naturelle? There is a kind of novelty here
which is quite distinct from the emergentist insistence that ‘biological
causes’ or even ‘psychological causes’ might be more complex than brute
physical causes, and even self-affecting, in the sense of what eighteenth-
century medical vitalists (whose inºuence on Diderot is well-documented)
described as the “cercle d’action.” The latter idea is that in the “animal
economy,” the constant “action and reaction” is too complex for mechanis-
tic explanations, and the causal principle on which they rest, to be of
much use. In the words of the vitalist physician Louis de La Caze (which
may even have been written by his younger collaborator Bordeu, whose
ªctional analog plays a key role in D’Alembert’s Dream),
There is . . . a circle of action [cercle d’action] in which a vicissitude
constantly generated by the chain of causes and effects, entails that
within it at any moment, effects become causes and causes in turn
become effects. . . . This chain is so impenetrable that one cannot
determine its beginning or end. Consequently, it is most difªcult to
impose a plan on the animal economy, without running the risk of
transgressing the laws of right method, with respect to this marvel-
ous contrivance of action. (La Caze 1755, pp. 68–69.)
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5. Réfutation d’Helvétius, in Diderot 1994, p. 796; letter to Landois of June 29th, 1756
in Diderot 1975, vol. IX, p. 258.
6. Salon de 1767, in Diderot 1975–, vol. XVI, p. 222 / Diderot 1996, p. 625.
Granted, if the kind of naturalism we are discussing here is also a material-
ism, it is noteworthy that it is not mechanistic and instead takes as its
privileged explanatory target the realm of living entities—which is pre-
cisely what natural history does. This is an important topic that has only
recently begun to receive the attention it deserves, both with studies of
medical vitalism in the period and how it related to philosophical materi-
alism.7 However, my present interest is with the role of a kind of
artiªcialism within this naturalist project. What kind of a naturalistic on-
tology survives the recognition that our ªnite intellects might never be
able to access ‘Nature’ itself? Indeed, Diderot contrasts “the inªnite mul-
titude of natural phenomena” with “the limitations of our understanding
and the weakness of our organs” (“la multitude inªnie des phénomènes de
la nature” . . . “les bornes de notre entendement et la faiblesse de nos
organes”) (Diderot, Interprétation de la nature, § vi, in Diderot 1994,
p. 562). This is the sort of question I aim to answer in what follows. But
before I turn to the natural history program in its eighteenth-century,
‘radical Enlightenment’ variant, I should remove a possible source of
confusion.
Naturalism—the project of treating philosophical explanations as part
of a broader project of natural science, or redeªning a feature of mental
life, whether a process like perception or a deªnitory feature like inten-
tionality, so that it is compatible with the broader set of deªnitions pro-
vided by the cluster of relevant sciences, whichever they may be (to
naturalize an X according to population dynamics, neurophysiology or
fundamental physics tends to mean three different things)—appears to us
today as something very different from ‘natural history’, whether because
the latter cluster of activities no longer exists as such, or because it is actu-
ally equivalent with the ‘life sciences’ as a whole, and a science is not the
same thing as a philosophical project of reconstruction or redeªnition in
the name of a science.8 This would seem to imply that I am running to-
gether two very different kinds of conceptual objects, in seeking to derive
from Diderot’s natural history program an idiosyncratic ‘brand’ or ‘ver-
sion’ of naturalism. However, from the standpoint of an eighteenth-
century materialist like Diderot, the two are part and parcel of the same
program. It is precisely because human beings can and should be treated
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7. See Rey 2000, Williams 1994, 2003 and Wolfe 1999; an exception is the surpris-
ingly inaccurate and out-of-date analysis of “materialism and vitalism” in Wellman 2003,
an entry in a major reference work, the Oxford Companion to the History of Modern Science; see
the criticisms in Kaitaro 2008 and Wolfe and Terada 2008b. For vitalism in relation to
materialism see Thomson 2001.
8. I owe the latter point to a reviewer for Perspectives on Science.
as parts of ‘natural history’ that their mental faculties should be inscribed
monistically within a single explanatory and ontological scheme. Thus
Diderot declares in his notebooks on physiology that “the action of the
soul on the body is the action of one part of the body on another,” and,
closer to the revisionist tone of naturalism, he comments in the margins of
Hemsterhuis’ Lettre sur l’homme that “wherever I read soul I replace it with
man or animal.”9
Cabinets of curiosities, Wunderkammern or ‘natural history cabinets’ are
fascinating enough objects in and of themselves, however much they are
studied (as in Falguières 2003). The aspect that I wish to emphasize here
appears in Diderot’s Encyclopédie article precisely entitled “Cabinet d’his-
toire naturelle” (as well as in “Histoire naturelle”—large chunks of Buffon
reworked by Diderot along with smaller chunks by Daubenton—
“Méthode” and various reºections in Diderot’s Pensées sur l’interprétation de
la nature):
The order of a cabinet cannot be that of nature; nature affects every-
where a sublime disorder. Whichever side we approach it from, we
ªnd masses [masses] which transport us with admiration, groups
which call for our attention in the most surprising manner. But a
natural history cabinet is made to teach us; there, we must ªnd in de-
tail and in order, that which the universe presents to us as one piece
[en bloc]. (Diderot, art. “Cabinet d’Histoire Naturelle,” in Diderot
1975–, vol. VI, p. 240.)
A natural history cabinet is intended to be in the service of a naturalistic
cause, yet from its inception it declares to us that its “order” is not the or-
der of Nature. How could it be that a “cabinet d’histoire naturelle,” pre-
cisely as a cousin of the wonder-ªlled, monster-ªlled “cabinet of curiosi-
ties” or Wunderkammer, could actually convey a reductionist explanatory
project of inscribing human life within the causal realm of Nature?
For one thing, as the Encyclopédie entry on method in the study of
Nature explains,10 our understanding of Nature is dependent on the
“method” with which we approach it, according to which we analyze it;
since the objects studied by natural history are too great in number to be
apprehended as such, the historian of nature—the biologist or materialist
philosopher—must lay out “an order of relations [rapports] and analo-
gies”(Ibid., 459a). Of course, relying too much on method is the character-
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9. Diderot, Éléments de physiologie, in Diderot 1975–, XVII, pp. 334–335; Observations
sur Hemsterhuis, in Diderot 1994, p. 734.
10. “Méthode (division méthodique des différentes productions de la nature),”
Encyclopédie X, 458b–459b (hereafter cited as Enc. followed by volume and page number).
istic trait of “methodists” like Linnaeus, so decried by Buffon and Diderot
on Lockean-nominalistic grounds.11 The article “Histoire Naturelle” fur-
ther explains that it is impossible to visit each country, climb down into
each mine, or up on every mountaintop, and sail on each sea: “Such obsta-
cles would discourage the most enterprising ones among us, and would
lead them to give up the study of natural history.” Luckily, “we have found
a way to shorten and smooth the surface of the earth in favour of the natu-
ralists; we have collected individuals of each species of animals and plants
. . . in cabinets of natural history. We can see there a short version [un
abrégé] of nature in its entirety” (Enc., VIII, 229a). Such techniques facili-
tate learning and instill in us “a new ardor for the History of Nature” (Ibid.,
229b).
But, artiªcialisme oblige, none of this should be taken for the Life of Na-
ture itself! Cabinets enable us to acquire the ªrst rudiments of the science
of natural history, but not to know the science itself, “because one cannot
see there [sc. in the cabinets—CW] living and acting Nature” (ibid., empha-
sis mine). “Animal corpses,” their “remains,” are but a “pallid representa-
tion of living animals.” A cabinet is merely a ‘draft’ (une esquisse) of nature.
Notice the quasi-valuative emphasis placed here on “living nature”; on the
one hand, this is reminiscent of Diderot’s criticism of the usage of anatom-
ical models (skeletons, corpses, etc.) in painting, but on the other hand, it
is also a window onto his unique, ‘animated’ brand of naturalism.
Whether as a philosopher of nature or an aesthetic theorist, Diderot does-
n’t say ‘Ain’t it grand, what we can do with our imaginations!’ (a position
akin to Gothic/Baroque sensibility) but rather ‘Ain’t the power of living
nature grand, and beyond the reach of our intellects (except in thought-
experiments, as I have presented them in Le Rêve de D’Alembert)!’.
Diderot’s naturalism is unlike the various species of naturalisms found
in the past century (Dewey, Quine, Dennett), which in this sense are closer
to Spinoza’s naturalism, in that it does not proceed in a deºationary or re-
constructive manner, most of the time, except when seeking to explain a
concept such as ‘soul’ (the hint at a ‘materialist theory of the self’ as de-
rived from the central nervous system, in the Rêve, is perhaps an example
of a reconstruction of a phenomenon such as intentionality on materialist
grounds), but rather as an all-embracing metaphysics of living nature. The
extent to which a materialism which emphasizes the uniqueness of organic
beings (and thus the ‘laws’ speciªc to them; read ‘vitalism’) can also be a
reductionist project (or not) has been the subject of some debate recently12;
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11. In § xlviii of the Pensées sur l’interprétation de la nature, Diderot describes the empha-
sis on method in natural history as a kind of rationalism which is blind to experience
(1994, p. 586).
12. Timo Kaitaro’s excellent 1997 book argues, as its title indicates, for a very non-
but notice that whether Diderot is a reductionist or a holist, he seems to
insist on the qualitative difference between “living Nature” or “living
animals” and “animal corpses” or “remains,” including those that are
mounted in artiªcial settings, for gawkers or scientists.
However, I do not mean to diminish the status of artiªce in this theory.
It belongs right there in the middle of the relation between theory and ex-
perience, between “suppositions,” conjectures, and hypotheses on the one
hand, and brute empirie on the othe rhand. Artiªce, whether in the form of
a stuffed freak animal or a thought-experiment (the latter including the
notion of species as a “vue de l’esprit”), is required for the ‘pursuit of sci-
ence by other means’, mainly because of Nature’s inªnity, which implies
that any intellectual “grasping” of its immensity would instantly be the
death of any theoretical coherence. It is in this sense that Buffon can say
that the “experimental part” of natural history grounds and conªrms the
“hypothetical part,” “all of which is tied to my overall system, and guided
by a constant focus on the major objects of nature” (Buffon 1774, Partie
expérimentale, p. 143). Diderot in turn stresses the role of artiªcial con-
struction:
The observer is forced to move from one individual to another, but
the historian of nature is obliged to embrace it in great masses
[clusters, heaps]; he cuts these masses at points on the chain where
the nuances strike him most strongly, and he is careful not to imag-
ine that these divisions are the work of Nature. (Diderot, art. “Ani-
mal,” Enc. I, 471b.)
But it’s not as if all we knew was what we constructed, as in maker’s
knowledge, so we could forget about Nature itself; Diderot actually sug-
gests a more nuanced view in the “Prospectus” of the Encyclopédie, between
 orderly, rule-bound and uniform Nature—the Nature of bodies,
whether celestial or animal;
 “disturbed” Nature, such as anatomical ‘monsters’;
 Nature which is “constrained and forced to serve various uses, as
is the case with the arts.”
Both a stuffed freak animal in a ‘cabinet’ and a living anatomical anomaly
extend the boundaries of our intellects; “if we were asked what point there
is in the history of monstrous nature, we would reply: it enables us to move
from prodigies and the ‘leaps’ in Nature, to the wonders of art; to disturb
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reductionist Diderot. I hope to show differently; see my review of Kaitaro (Wolfe 2002)
and my forthcoming paper on the possibility of reading a “materialist biology” in Diderot
(Wolfe 2008a).
Nature even further, or to put it back on its rightful path” (Diderot 1975–
vol. V, p. 106). Quite a far cry from the distinction between the natural
and the artiªcial in valuative terms!13
My claim is that the genre of ‘natural history’ enabled reductionist ma-
terialist thought to integrate the notion of artiªce without dissolving Na-
ture into a mere ªction. For this to take place, the notion of natural his-
tory itself has to undergo a materialist inºéchissement. What did ‘natural
history’ mean in the early modern era? In the carefully nominalist terms of
current historiography of science, it was “a set of divergent traditions shar-
ing a general subject matter (the living world) and a set of catholic (with a
small ‘c’) naturalists” (Farber 1982, p. 398). But my concern is not with
the sociology of its research traditions. In the Encyclopédie’s classiªcation of
the sciences, the “système ªguré des connaissances humaines,” natural his-
tory belongs to “particular physics,” whereas “general physics” is ident-
iªed (by D’Alembert) with the “metaphysics of bodies” (“Discours prélim-
inaire,” Enc. I, p. xvii). The curious thing about the notion of natural
history from the start—it doesn’t require the adjustments of a Buffon or a
Diderot—is the way it blends the descriptive and the prescriptive; as the
Encyclopedia Britannica puts it in its ªrst edition (1771), it is “that science
which not only gives compleat descriptions of natural productions in gen-
eral, but also teaches the method of arranging them” (vol. III, p. 362).
The problem with this deªnition is that it’s still too bland and consen-
sual; it completely neglects the radical conceptual shift which takes place
with this expression, as can be seen also in its philosophical reappro-
priation, which we might divide into an initial, broad ‘naturalization’ and
a later, more speciªcally materialist redeªnition of natural history as a pro-
gram.
First, ªgures like Hume, La Mettrie and d’Holbach naturalize domains
such as religion, the soul, or the “human heart” (d’Holbach 1999, I, xi,
p. 292); already Locke described the project of his Essay as a “History of
the ªrst beginnings of human knowledge” (Locke 1975, II.xi.15), and the
“historical, plain method” announced at the beginning of the Essay (p. 44)
is a way of naturalizing a theological topos, a theme we ªnd again in
D’Alembert’s “Discours Préliminaire,” where he speaks of the need for a
“genealogy” of our knowledge, something we can undertake by “moving
back to the origin and generation of our ideas” (p. i).
Second, there is the later creation of a conceptual ‘bridge’ between ma-
terialist philosophy and the life sciences, especially natural history, which
is both a kind of proto-biology and at the same time quite distinct from
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13. As found, e.g. in the aesthetic theories criticized by Diderot, those of Batteux, or
Dubos.
it,14 especially since it contains a polemical element which will be elimi-
nated once it becomes ‘biology’: something non-mathematizable, at least in
the eyes of these materialists (which of course is a historical feature of their
materialism and by extension their idea of the reducing theory in a
reductionist model, which we have trouble reconciling with twentieth and
twenty-ªrst century philosophy and science). This insistence on the auton-
omy of the new ‘continent’ of life science—including medicine, physiol-
ogy, elements of chemistry and the study of generation—as distinct from
the mathematical and mechanistic trends of the Scientiªc Revolution, be-
gins with Buffon’s assertion that “mathematical truths are merely mental
abstractions, which lack anything real” (“les vérités mathématiques ne
sont que des abstractions de l’esprit qui n’ont rien de réel”),15 and is stated
more fully in section 4 of Diderot’s key methodological work Pensées sur
l’interprétation de la nature (1753/1754):
We are on the verge of a great revolution in the sciences. Given the
taste people seem to have for morals, belles-lettres, the history of na-
ture and experimental physics, I dare say that before a hundred
years, there will not be more than three great geometricians re-
maining in Europe. The science will stop short where the
Bernoullis, the Eulers, the Maupertuis, the Clairaut, the Fontaines
and the D’Alemberts will have left it. . . . We will not go beyond.16
One hears the same emphasis in the Encyclopédie: “People’s minds are
drawn in a general movement towards natural history, anatomy, chemistry,
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14. See the important work by Salomon-Bayet 1978, e.g. p. 145. Closely related se-
mantic/conceptual shifts occur with the terms organisation and économie animale. See
Motoichi Terada’s unpublished 2003 paper, Wolfe and Terada 2008, § 3 and Balan 1975.
15. “De la manière d’étudier l’Histoire Naturelle,” in Buffon 1749, p. 53. To be sure,
Buffon was also the author of works on mathematics, and a translator of Newton as well as
Stephen Hale’s Vegetable Staticks. But he remained convinced that the newly emerging clus-
ter of disciplines called ‘natural history’ would go nowhere if it was treated in strictly post-
Galilean, Accademia dell Cimmento-style mechanistic fashion. After all, Buffon was also
the theorist of ‘organic molecules’, which were a kind of vital minima, non-reducible to in-
organic entities. (One could complicate matters similarly by pointing out that Diderot
named an essay he had written on mathematical probability as his favourite amongst his
writings, along with D’Alembert’s Dream.)
16. “Nous touchons au moment d’une grande révolution dans les sciences. Au penchant
que les esprits me paraissent avoir à la morale, aux belles-lettres, à l’histoire de la nature, et
à la physique expérimentale, j´oserais presque assurer qu´avant qu’il soit cent ans, on ne
comptera pas trois grands géomètres en Europe. Cette science s’arrêtera tout court où
l’auront laissée les Bernoulli, les Euler, les Maupertuis, les Clairaut, les Fontaine et les
d’Alembert. . . . On n’ira point au-delà” (Diderot, Pensées sur l’interprétation de la nature, § 4,
in Diderot 1994, p. 561).
and experimental physics.”17 It is noteworthy in this regard that there is
no article on Galileo in the original edition of the Encyclopédie (whereas
Galileo features prominently, e.g. in Brucker’s Historia critica philosophiae,
which is a major source of the Encyclopédie).18 But to return to Buffon and
Diderot’s shared claim, let us distinguish between two distinct points
within it:
 the negative claim that mathematical entities are just abstrac-
tions and have nothing to do with physical truth19 (which is an
inversion of the relation between mathematics and natural his-
tory that was characteristic of the seventeenth century), and
 the positive, or at least programmatic claim that the experimen-
tal world of natural history, anatomy, chemistry, etc. is where the
future lies—not just for ‘science’ but for philosophy, precisely
understood in naturalistic terms.
Georges Gusdorf’s comment, in his enormous study of the emergence of
the human sciences, that “materialist philosophy may be considered as an
attempt to deepen the project and the data of natural history” (Gusdorf
1972, p. 320), falls under the second of these two senses. Natural history
in the latter sense is a reconstructive, deºationary program: I take a phe-
nomenon called ‘soul’ and seek to integrate it into what natural history
tells me about animals, plants, generation, states of coma, etc., and what is
left after this integration is a concept of soul I can work with. Similarly,
the little-known work by Maupertuis’ brother, Moreau de Saint-Elier, en-
titled Traité de la communication des maladies et des passions, avec un essai pour
servir à l’histoire naturelle de l’homme (1738), explicitly links the project of
“natural history” with the materialist project of explaining the workings
of the soul in purely natural, and a fortiori, physiological terms.
Indeed, there is some historical evidence for considering cabinets d’his-
toire naturelle and the overall project of natural history as being synony-
mous with materialist philosophy. They were attacked by the enemies of
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17. Art. “Encyclopédie,” in Diderot 1994, p. 372 / 1975–, vol. VII, p. 185. Similar
passages can be found in his letter to Voltaire of February 19th, 1758, and in Grimm’s
Correspondance littéraire, June 1st 1765, vol. IV, 1, p. 649. Diderot’s defense of Buffon
against the bishop of Auxerre in the Suite de l’apologie de l’abbé de Prades similarly opposes
the study of Nature to mathematical abstractions (see Diderot 1994, p. 529f.). His
oppositional construction, between sciences one might call ‘vital’ and ‘hard’ sciences, reads
like a hyper-emphatic version of Kuhn’s distinction between “mathematical traditions”
and “experimental traditions” in the history of science (Kuhn 1976).
18. As noted by Salomon-Bayet 1978, p. 384.
19. These are almost Buffon’s words, but see the helpful commentary in Sloan 1995,
p. 129.
the philosophes, such as Nicolas Linguet, author of the pamphlet Le Fana-
tisme des Philosophes (1764), who in a later text regretted that “a taste for
natural history has become quite common. Rich countries are ªlled with
cabinets. . . . Look at this spectacle of Nature dead and dissected . . .”20
Natural history occupies the conceptual space which will be that of bi-
ology, and it must be understood that this was a wholly polemical project in
the mid-eighteenth century. Consider Diderot’s two strategically located
statements of epigenesis; the ªrst, in his ‘experimental novel’ D’Alembert’s
Dream, with the “voyez-vous cet œuf?” passage which serves as the epi-
graph to François Jacob’s La logique du vivant:
Do you see this egg? It is with this [egg] that we overturn all
schools of theology and all the temples of the world. What is this
egg? An unsensing mass prior to the introduction of the seed
[germe]; and after the seed has been introduced, what is it then? An
unsensing mass, for the seed itself is merely an inert, crude ºuid.
How will this mass move to another [level of ] organization, to sen-
sitivity and life? By means of heat. What will heat produce therein?
Movement. (Rêve de D’Alembert, in Diderot 1994, p. 618; cf.
pp. 706–707.)
or the deªnition of “modern Spinosists” in the Encyclopédie which, idiosyn-
cratically enough, makes them theorists of the then-brand new doctrine of
biological epigenesis:
Spinosist: follower of the philosophy of Spinosa. One must not
confuse the ancient Spinosists with the modern Spinosists. The
general principle of the latter is that matter is sensitive; they dem-
onstrate this by the development of the egg, an inert body which
by the sole means [instrument] of graduated heat moves to the state
of a sensing, living being, and by the growth of any animal which
in its inception [principe] is merely a point, and through the nutri-
tive assimilation of plants and—in one word—of all substances that
serve the purpose of nutrition, becomes a great sensing and living
body in a greater [expanse of ] space. From this they conclude that
only matter exists, and that it is sufªcient to explain everything.
For the rest, they follow ancient Spinosism in all of its conse-
quences.21
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20. Linguet, Annales politiques, civiles, et littéraires du XVIIIe siècle 1777, quoted in
Metzger 1987, p. 247, n. 4.
21. Diderot, s.v. “Spinosistes,” Encyclopédie XV, 474 / Diderot 1994, p. 484. This brief
article is the basis for Paul Vernière’s giant—and fanciful—category of ‘neo-Spinozism’,
which he applied to eighteenth-century radical thought approximately half a century be-
These passages have very different tones, as beªts their different contexts:
in the ªrst, Diderot can boldly state that a biological ‘fact’ will overturn
all faculties of theology, because the novel was not intended for publica-
tion, and indeed only entered the public realm in the nineteenth century;
in the second, which occurs in the Encyclopédie, he has to be somewhat
more discreet. Regardless, in both cases he is making an unusual claim
that certain facts about generation (what we would call developmental bi-
ology) radically modify the philosophical landscape. In the second quota-
tion, he is saying that to be a Spinozist in the mid-eighteenth century is
essentially to hold a particular biological theory to be true! Notice the
redeªnition of matter as something either essentially or at least potentially
sensitive (Diderot wavers on this point), but deªnitely not inert22: another
nail in the cofªn of mechanism, which would have surprised Spinoza, who
was no anti-mechanist.
Now, all of this is part and parcel of natural history understood as a ma-
terialist program. Diderot’s late, unªnished work Éléments de physiologie,
which would have been the culminating statement of his biologically
grounded materialism, simply bears the title of Albrecht von Haller’s
monumental work Elementa Physiologiae; according to his friend and biog-
rapher Naigeon, the work, if completed, would have been entitled Histoire
naturelle et expérimentale de l’homme (Dieckmann 1951, p. 186). But what
this implies for our overall discussion is that the brand of naturalism that
emerges here is both ontologically materialist and focused on the necessary
construction of artiªcial entities in the name of its naturalistic project.
Notably, the ontology of Nature here is anything but monolithic; a
contemporary naturalist would say its ontology is always provisional; in a
rather Gallic twist on the scientiªc ebullience of the Enlightenment,
Diderot says that Nature is “une femme qui aime à se travestir”23; not a
transvestite, but a woman concealed underneath an inªnite number of
‘travesties’. Natural forms are nothing but “masks” (Éléments de physiologie,
in Diderot 1994, p. 1261). As deªned canonically in D’Alembert’s Dream,
Nature is (a) fundamentally heterogeneous (that is, the atoms which com-
pose the natural world exist in a state of heterogeneity and agitation) and
(b) never entirely “speciªc” (précis) (Rêve de D’Alembert, in Diderot 1994,
p. 636). It is in this rather sober sense that Diderot denies the founda-
Perspectives on Science 69
fore Israel 2001. For one of the few useful analyses of Diderot’s biologically motivated
‘reinvention’ of Spinozism, see Métraux 1994.
22. On the decline of the mechanistic paradigm and the rejection of the inertness of
matter, see Fox 1987.
23. Interprétation de la nature, § xii, in Diderot 1994, p. 565. This is a modern twist on
Heraclitus’ phusis kruptesthai philei or “Nature likes to hide” (fr. 208).
tional distinction between Nature and artiªce. After all, how could one
make an essentialist claim to have identiªed ‘Nature’ if she is hidden be-
neath so many travestissements? The latter should be taken both in the sense
of ‘travesties’, of masks, and of the perpetual “vicissitudes” which befall
natural forms. The heuristic constructs by which we seek to grasp nature
similarly are ‘travesties’, but this does not prevent the materialist philoso-
pher from maintaining a strong commitment to causality, along with the
scientiªc project which follows from it. However,
The universe only presents to us particular beings, inªnite in num-
ber, with hardly any ªxed or determinate division. None can be
termed the ªrst or the last; everything is linked therein, and follows
what came before by imperceptible nuances. In this immense uni-
formity of objects, if some appear which, like the tips of rocks,
seem to pierce through the surface and dominate it, they only owe
this prerogative to particular systems, vague conventions, and for-
eign events—and not to the physical arrangement of beings and the
intention of Nature.24
There is no place for the human observer in this desolate landscape. As ob-
served a few paragraphs later in the same text, the only thing that makes
the existence of the spectacle of Nature interesting is the human presence
itself.
One consideration above all must not be lost sight of, and that is
that if man or the thinking, contemplating being is banished from
the surface of the earth, this moving and sublime spectacle of na-
ture becomes nothing but a sad and mute scene. . . . Everything
changes into a vast solitude where unobserved phenomena occur in
a manner dark and mute.25
Instead of losing himself in reveries about the poetics of ruins and our
transitory existence on the face of the earth, however, Diderot instantly as-
serts the pragmatic, ‘constructivist’ and artiªcialist conclusion: since “It is
the presence of man that makes the existence of beings interesting,” “Why
not make man the center of our work?” (“Pourquoi n’introduirons-nous
pas l’homme dans notre ouvrage?”), in other terms, why not create cabinets
d’histoire naturelle? Naturalism here opens onto pragmatism and instru-
mentalism: a cabinet is an explicit case of the methodology Diderot de-
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24. Diderot, art. “Encyclopédie,” Enc. V, 641b / Diderot 1975–, vol. VII, pp. 210–211,
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297a.
25. Ibid., 641c / p. 212; trans. Philip Stewart (modiªed), in Encyclopedia of Diderot and
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scribes as “joining the combinations of art to those of nature” (Interpréta-
tion de la nature, § lviii, in Diderot 1994, p. 596).
Diderot’s naturalism is not only unique because it loads the concept of
Nature with many animate properties, sensitivity above all, or because of
its pragmatic, instrumentalist dimension; it also is unusually ‘vaccinated’
against positivism of the sort Nietzsche warned against rather trenchantly,
and which I shall quote in full:
Let us be on our guard. Let us be on our guard against thinking
that the world is a living being. Where could it extend itself?
What could it nourish itself with? How could it grow and increase?
We know tolerably well what the organic is; and we are to reinter-
pret the emphatically derivative, tardy, rare and accidental, which
we only perceive on the crust of the earth, into the essential, uni-
versal and eternal, as those do who call the universe an organism?
That disgusts me. Let us now be on our guard against believing
that the universe is a machine; it is assuredly not constructed with
a view to one end; we invest it with far too high an honor with the
word “machine.” Let us be on our guard against supposing that
anything so methodical as the cyclic motions of our neighboring
stars obtains generally and throughout the universe; indeed a
glance at the Milky Way induces doubt as to whether there are not
many cruder and more contradictory motions there, and even stars
with continuous, rectilinearly gravitating orbits, and the like. The
astral arrangement in which we live is an exception; this arrange-
ment, and the relatively long durability which is determined by it,
has again made possible the exception of exceptions, the formation
of organic life. The general character of the world, on the other
hand, is to all eternity chaos; not by the absence of necessity, but in
the sense of the absence of order, structure, form, beauty, wisdom,
and whatever else our aesthetic humanities are called. Judged by
our reason, the unlucky casts are far oftenest the rule, the excep-
tions are not the secret purpose; and the whole musical box repeats
eternally its air, which can never be called a melody—and ªnally
the very expression, “unlucky cast” is already an anthropomorphiz-
ing which involves blame. But how could we presume to blame or
praise the universe? Let us be on our guard against ascribing to it
heartlessness and unreason, or their opposites; it is neither perfect,
nor beautiful, nor noble; nor does it seek to be anything of the
kind, it does not at all attempt to imitate man! It is altogether un-
affected by our aesthetic and moral judgments! Neither has it any
self-preservative instinct, nor instinct at all; it also knows no law.
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Let us be on our guard against saying that there are laws in nature.
There are only necessities: there is no one who commands, no one
who obeys, no one who transgresses. When you know that there is
no design, you know also that there is no chance: for it is only
where there is a world of design that the word “chance” has a mean-
ing. . . . When will all these shadows of God cease to obscure us?
When shall we have nature entirely undeiªed? When shall we be
permitted to naturalize ourselves by means of the pure, newly dis-
covered, newly redeemed nature?26
Diderot is vaccinated against the hope that we’ll truly come to ‘know’ Na-
ture, from his early warnings against physico-theology or the argument
from design, put forth by the blind mathematician Saunderson in the Let-
ter on the Blind, to his critique of anthropomorphism in the Salon de 1767:
We are in nature. Sometimes we feel right there [good, happy, com-
fortable], sometimes not. And do believe that those who praise na-
ture in the spring for having carpeted the earth in green, a friendly
color to our eyes, are just presumptuous wise-asses who forget that
this nature whose goodness they wish to ªnd everywhere, in every-
thing, in winter lays across our countrysides a great white blanket
which wounds our eyes, makes us dizzy and threatens us with dy-
ing, frozen. Nature is good and beautiful when it favours us. It is
ugly and evil when it afºicts us. It often owes a part of its charms
to our own efforts. (Diderot, Salon de 1767, in Diderot 1975–, vol.
XVI, 187 / Diderot 1996, p. 602.)
Interestingly enough, in historical terms, it seems, as Gerhardt Stenger
has pointed out, that this caution on Diderot’s part is partially due to his
encounters with Abbé Galiani, as the following passage from Galiani
shows:
And we, who are we? Insects, atoms, nothing. Let’s compare our-
selves [to nature]. To be sure, nature faithfully returns to the laws
its author gave it, in order to last an indeªnite time. To be sure, it
restores all things to a balance, but we don’t have time to await this
return or this balance. We are too small; time, space and motion are
nothing to it; we cannot wait. Let us not, then, make a pact [alli-
ance] with nature; it would be too disproportionate. Our task down
here is to ªght it. Look around. See the cultivated ªelds, the foreign
plants introduced into our climes, the ships, the cars, the tamed an-
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imals, houses, streets, ports, dikes and pavements. Here are the en-
trenchments in which we ªght; all the pleasures of our lives, in-
deed, nearly existence itself, are the price of victory. With our few
skills and the wit that God gave us, we are battling nature and we
often manage to conquer and master it, by using its strength
against itself. A singular combat, which shows man the image of
his creator.27
For Galiani, the Lockean imperative to cultivate Nature leads to agricul-
ture; for Diderot, it leads to philosophy, the production of encyclopedias
. . . or cabinets of natural history. We might recognize a Baconian trend
here, but the ‘ªctional’ dimension of cabinets seems fairly far removed
from inductivism. Nor would Bacon have approved of the anti-mathemat-
ical impulse in Diderot and Buffon.28
* * *
Instead of insisting on multiplicity or the cult of ruins, Diderot’s response
to this challenge of the unknowability of Nature is to some extent a prag-
matic instrumentalist one: Nature cannot be known as such, in its magni-
tude; we construct encyclopedias as provisional systems of human knowl-
edge, and amusing, kitschy ªctional structures with and through which
we can know Nature, in a sort of verum ipsum factum; the limit of all this
complexity is in fact utility: “l’utile circonscrit tout.”29 Our relation to nature
is an interplay between such constructs or thought-experiments on the
one hand, and the constant reminder of living nature’s magnitude on
the other hand. The sense that we live in a universe of relations of inªnite
complexity, to be grasped by our perception des rapports and to be ‘recon-
structed’ both pragmatically—the ‘cabinet’—and epistemologically—the
programmatic dimensions of the article “Encyclopédie”—is inseparably a
materialist sense, we might say of Spinozist provenance, and an aesthetic
sense, derived from the ‘practice’ of the Salons.30 And Nature itself behaves
no differently than the technologist: “the bird of prey extends or shortens
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its gaze, like the astronomer extends or shortens her telescope’s focus.”
(Éléments de physiologie, in Diderot 1994, p. 1276). The vitalist elements
here do not in the end prevail in any strong sense, since Diderot admits
that, just as the physico-mathematical sciences gave way to the ‘life sci-
ences’, some day, “in several centuries, utility will limit what we do in ex-
perimental physics” (Interprétation de la nature, § vi, in Diderot 1994,
p. 563). As such, the “naturalisme de cabinet” (literally, a ‘closet natural-
ism’) we’ve seen here needs to be distinguished from a few classic positions
or critiques in intellectual history:
ii(i) It has nothing to do with any project of naturalizing the social
world. Neither agency, nor the human capacity to make represen-
tations and live in a symbolic realm, are denied, on the contrary.
This is Diderot’s critique of Helvétius.
i(ii) The “cabinets” do not function, in any relevant way, as a rational-
ization of nature, over and against the full-blown, raw, unimpeded
“étrangeté animale” of the Renaissance.31 In my view, the notion of
“cabinet” and of histoire naturelle as a whole, at least in the materi-
alist version examined here, is if anything anti-mathematical, op-
posing the world of Nature and experience to the world of mathe-
matical abstractions, whereas for Foucault it is a new form of
mathesis universalis, with the cabinets presenting different surfaces,
structures, planes, solids . . . (Ibid., p. 149). Similarly, inasmuch as
the emphasis on living, biological nature gives this naturalism its
anti-mathematical ºavour, it is much less susceptible to the
charges of rationalism associated with the ‘dialectic of Enlighten-
ment’ theme, which Foucault merely updates from the Frankfurt
School, and which can be found in modiªed versions throughout
inºuential Anglophone studies of the Enlightenment (e.g. Peter
Gay’s or Lester Crocker’s).
(iii) Despite the fact that Diderot clearly holds that we are parts of Na-
ture and nothing more, the artiªcialist dimension in his thought,
which is apparent in the theme of the “cabinet of natural history,”
and in his distinction between the observer of nature and the in-
terpreter of nature, means his position cannot be reduced to strict
Baconian experimental empiricism either.32
In the end I have not shed much light on the nature of naturalism itself
(the question of whether it’s more of an epistemology or an ontology is
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31. As argued by Foucault 1966, p. 143.
32. As observed by Kaitaro 1997, pp. 76–77. To compare the programs for natural his-
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signiªcant; perhaps it could also be considered as an attitude towards the
practice of philosophy), but have instead focused on what I’ve claimed to
be unique or at least unusual in Diderot’s “naturalisme de cabinet.” Due
perhaps to his recognition of an irreducible complexity in Nature which
does not allow it to be rationalized as some philosophers of science might
like, and his ensuing emphasis on utility and instrumentalism as the
guidelines in reºecting on Nature, and regardless of his occasional forays
into aesthetic anti-naturalism, Diderot does in the end declare that “Na-
ture speaks louder than philosophy.”33
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